Main articles: UK banking law, Banking law, and Security interes

        The general principle, according to the Mellish LJ in Re Jeavons, ex parte Mackay[38] is that "a person cannot make it a part of his contract that, in the event of bankruptcy, he is then to get some additional advantage which prevents the property being distributed under the bankruptcy laws." So in that case, Jeavons made a contract to give Brown & Co an armour plates patent, and in return Jeavons would get royalties. Jeavons also got a loan from Brown & Co. They agreed half the royalties would pay off the loan, but if Jeavons went insolvent, Brown & Co would not have to pay any royalties. The Court of Appeal held half the royalties would still need to be paid, because this was a special right for Brown & Co that only arose upon insolvency.
        In a case where a creditor is owed money by an insolvent company, but also the creditor itself owes a sum to the company, Forster v Wilson[39] held that the creditor may set-off the debt, and only needs to pay the difference. The creditor does not have to pay all its debts to the company, and then wait with other unsecured creditors for an unlikely repayment.
        However, this depends on the sums for set-off actually being in the creditors' possession. In British Eagle International Air Lines Ltd v Compaigne Nationale Air France,[40] a group of airlines, through the International Air Transport Association had a netting system to deal with all the expenses they incurred to one another efficiently. All paid into a common fund, and then at the end of each month, the sums were settled at once. British Eagle went insolvent and was a debtor overall to the scheme, but Air France owed it money. Air France claimed it should not have to pay British Eagle, was bound to pay into the netting scheme, and have the sums cleared there. The House of Lords said this would have the effect of evading the insolvency regime. It did not matter that the dominant purpose of the IATA scheme was for good business reasons. It was nevertheless void.
        Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc observed that the general principle consists of two subrules — the anti-deprivation rule (formerly known as "fraud upon the bankruptcy law") and the pari passu rule, which are addressed to different mischiefs — and held that, in borderline cases, a commercially sensible transaction entered into in good faith should not be held to infringe the first rule.
        All these anti-avoidance rules are, however, subject to the very large exception that creditors remain able to jump up the priority queue, through the creation of a security interest.

See also: Netting and Set-off (law)
Secured lending
Main articles: UK banking law, Banking law, and Security interest
The Bank of England (est 1694) is the lender to all other banks, at an interest rate set by the Monetary Policy Committee under the Bank of England Act 1998. When lending on money to businesses at a higher interest rate, banks will contract for fixed and floating charges to decrease their risk and stabilise profits.

Any money due for interest on debts proven in the winding up process.

Since the Bankruptcy Act 1542 a key principle of insolvency law has been that losses are shared among creditors proportionately. Creditors who fall into the same class will share proportionally in the losses (e.g. each creditor gets 50 pence for each £1 she is owed). However, this pari passu principle only operates among creditors within the strict categories of priority set by the law:[32]

    The law permits creditors making contracts with a company before insolvency to take a security interest over a company's property. If the security is refers to some specific asset, the holder of this "fixed charge" may take the asset away free from anybody else's interest in order to satisfy the debt. If two charges are created over the same property, the charge holder with the first will have the first access.
    The Insolvency Act 1986 section 176ZA gives special priority to all the fees and expenses of the insolvency practitioner, who carries out an administration or winding up. The practitioner's expenses will include the wages due on any employment contract that the practitioner chooses to adopt.[33] But controversially, the Court of Appeal in Krasner v McMath held this would not include the statutory requirement to pay compensation for a management's failure to consult upon collective redundancies.[34]
    Even if they are not retained, employees' wages up to £800 and sums due into employees' pensions, are to be paid under section 175.
    A certain amount of money must be set aside as a "ring fenced fund" for all creditors without security under section 176A. This is set by statutory instrument as a maximum of £600,000, or 20 per cent of the remaining value, or 50 per cent of the value of anything under £10,000. All these preferential categories (for insolvency practitioners, employees, and a limited amount for unsecured creditors) come in priority to the holder of a floating charge.
    Floating charge holders come next. Like a fixed charge, a floating charge can be created by a contract with a company before insolvency. Like with a fixed charge, this is usually done in return for a loan from a bank. But unlike a fixed charge, a floating charge need not refer to a specific asset of the company. It can cover the entire business, including a fluctuating body of assets that is traded with day today, or assets that a company will receive in future. The preferential categories were created by statute to prevent secured creditors taking all assets away. This reflected the view that the power of freedom of contract should be limited to protect employees, small businesses or consumers who have unequal bargaining power.[35]
    After funds are taken away to pay all preferential groups and the holder of a floating charge, the remaining money due to unsecured creditors. In 2001 recovery rates were found to be 53% of one's debt for secured lenders, 35% for preferential creditors but only 7% for unsecured creditors on average.[36]
    Any money due for interest on debts proven in the winding up process.
    Money due to company members under a share redemption contract.
    Debts due to members who hold preferential rights.
    Ordinary shareholders, who have the right to residual assets.

Aside from pari passu or a priority scheme, historical insolvency laws used many methods for distributing losses. The Talmud (ca 200AD) envisaged that each remaining penny would be dealt out to each creditor in turn, until a creditor received all he was owed, or the money ran out. This meant the small creditors were more likely to be paid in full than large and powerful creditors.[37]

The priority system is reinforced by a line of case law, whose principle is to ensure that creditors cannot contract out of the statutory regime:

Fixed charge holders

The Insolvency Act 1986 priority list

    Fixed charge holders
    Insolvency practitioner fees and expenses, s 176ZA
    Preferential creditors, ss 40, 115, 175, 386 and Sch 6
    Ring fenced fund for unsecured creditors, s 176A and SI 2003/2097
    Floating charge holders
    Unsecured creditors, s 74(2)(f)
    Interest on debts proved in winding up, s 189
    Money due to a member under a contract to redeem or repurchase shares not completed before winding up, CA 2006 s 735
    Debts due to members under s 74(2)(f)
    Repayment of residual interests to preference, and then ordinary shareholders.

Sources: Insolvency Act 1986 and Companies Act 2006